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WhatAdvanced Countries Can Learn
fromthe Experience with Indexatjon:
SomeConcluding Observations
Aslistened to Affonso Pastore's opening address at this conference, I had
the feeling that we had been gathered togetherfom the four corners of the
eah to hear the Gospel of Iridexatiun according toSão Paulo. That being
the case, I feel I should remind you that historically thegospel of São Paulo
originated in sermons given in Jerusalem. Similarly, as Ephraini Kleiman
explained in his paper, indexation has been a familiar phenomenon in
Israel for over three decades, going back as it does to the periodof World
War II. Accordingly, what I would like to do in theseconcluding remarks is
to take advantage of the experience with indexationof both countries
what I have learned at this conference about Brazil, togetherwith what I
know about my own countryto see what lessonsthe advanced
economies can learn. And I only regret that because oflack of knowledge I
cannot base my discussion on the Finnish experience aswell.
My point of departure for this discussion is the observationthat indexa-
tion has not been adopted by developed countries like theUnited States
and those of Western Europe, E)Lit by Finland, Israel, andBrazilCountries
well along the path to development but not modern developedeconomies
in the fullest sense of the term. So the question naturally arisesjust what
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is there in the nature of the developedeconomy that has created this
revealed lack of preference for indexation?
One simple possibility is that the demand for ndexation isan in leasing
function of the rate of inflation, and that itis only in recent years that the
developed economies have reached the two-digit level ofinflation which
apparently activates this demand. Anotherniore fundamental explanation
for this revealed preference is the fact that by theirvery nature develope(j
economies have developed markets, especially free labormarkets and
highly developed capital markets, which achieve muchof the inflation
adjustment that indexation is designed to produce.
Corres)ondi ngly, when we come to draw lessonsbr the developed
economies, the relevant comparison is not between a country withindexa
tion and one with a controlledeconomy in which nominal quantities
(prices, money wages, exchange rate, and interest)are held constant in the
face of inflation, hut, rather, a comparison withan economy in which these
nominal quantities are adjusted to the inflationarypressures by the free
workings 01 the market. For the basic fact ofinflationarylifeisthat
individuals do not suffer from money illusion, at leastnot for any pro-
tracted period of time. Thus, itis a commonplace of both theory and
practice that even in the absence of indexation, any prolongedinflationary
process in a relatively free market economy generates continuouslyrising
prices and wages in all sectors of theeconomy, ever-rising exchange rates
(if the inflation is faster than in other countries), anda nominal interest rate
that is higher the higher the expectedrate of inflation.
In this conimonplace observation thereare two key terms: 'free market
economy" and 'expected rate." And the distinctivenature of indexation is
related to these terms.
In particular, the nominal rate of interestas determined in a free market
economy will reflect future rates of inflationcorrectly only to the extent
that these rates are correctlyanticipated. That this frequently doesnot
Occur in practice is evidenced by the fact thatthe ex-post real interestrate
in inflationary economies isfrequently negative, Henceone of the primary
l)1lrposes of indexation is to eliminate thenecessity for correctly anticipat-
i ng the rate of inflation by nuking contractual arrangements wh ihby
means of the indexing clause, stipulatereal rates of interest instead of
nominal ones. This aspect ofindexation has attracted muchattention iii
recent years among monetary theorists,who have analyzed the mi-
croeconomic problem involved interms of a niodel ofa risk-averting
individual choosing an optimumportfolio of assets,one of which has a rate
of return whose real valueis certain hut whose indexed nominavalue is not,1
More generally, indexation in thestrict sense of the term impliesthat no
matter what the actual rate of inflationturns out to he, the parnec toanridexation: Concluding Observations
indexed agreement can be certain about the realternis of exchange during
the term of the contract. From this viewpoint it hasbeco-1clear to Inc from the discussion of the past few days that the
degree of iridexatiori in Brazil is really a lesser one thanhad originally thought.
Ishall return to
this point later.
Besides the role that indexation ctn PI)y inSolving this problemof
unanticipated inflation,it can also enter thel)icture because there isno
economy in which all prices are determined by a freelyfunctioning market.
At one extreme, the absence of such a marketcan take the form of an
economy operating under an extensive system of price,wage and foreign
exchange controls. But even in an economy in whichsuch controls do not
formally exist there are always sonic administeredprices, particularly of
goods and services sold by or under the supervision ofthe govemnnlent (for
example, exchange rates, public utility rates, and thelike). There are also
other nominal money quantities determined bygovernments, suchas
inconie tax brackets.
In all these cases, a prolonged inflationary process will ultiniatelybring
about an increase in the nominal quantities in question. Thus, in theface of
a continued inflation, even controlled prices and exchange rates will
ultimately be raised, and the same will be true of such nominalquantities
as income tax brackets and the like. Such upward adjustments, however,
will usually be made only with a lageither because of the cumbersome-
ness of the bureaucratic procedure, or possibly the need to take even
more cumbersome legislative action. And the lagging of such controlled
prices behind the general inflationary process will lead to distortions of the
price structure and all that follows from that.
The purpose of indexation in such casesis then to lessen or even
eliminate the lag in adjusting official prices. As such, its role is that of
preventing the distortionsand changes in distribution of real income
that are generated by the lags that would otherwise exist. But this is not
indexation in the strict sense of removing uncertainty about future real
quantities. Correspondingly, the use oi indexation in such cases does not
(as distinct from its use in loan contracts) introduce any basically new
element into microeconornic theory. It does, however, raise a question
with respect to the macroeconomic theory of inflation. For the use of
indexation in these contexts may speed up the inflationary process, Ijarticu-
larlyin the case v'here demand- and cost-inflation are interacting.It
should, however, be emphasized that the crucial question here is the
difference (if any) between the rate at which inflation will proceed with
(say) automatically indexed wages, arid the rate at which it would ioceed
in a situation in which wage contracts are renegotiated (say) every year. For
I must once again emphasize that it is naive to assume that, in the absence





































to anIn theory, it is, of course, possible that indexation couldiilcreace the rate
of inflation enough to destabilize theprocess.But Cagarì's study of
hyperinflation (1956) shows how rarelynflanonarv procc'have hc
come unstable even in the most extreme cases. In any event,such an
unstable process has not been generated by theuse of indexation either in
Israel or in Brazil.
Let me now turn to the more specific lessons that the advancedCountries
can learn from the experience of indexation in these twocountries. For
convenience, Ishall organize the discussion under the followingmain
headings: (1) Fiscal arrangements, and(2) Contractual arrangements. The
latter is subdivided into (a) short-tern)(i) loans,(ii) wage rate, and (iii)
exchange rate; and (b)long-term--(i) loans and (ii) pensionsand an-
nuities.
Insofar as fiscal arrangementsare concerned, there are two nlain applica-
tions of indexation inBrazil:first,in the calculation of profits fortax
purposes; second, in the adjustment of income-tax or capital-gainstax
brackets. Though thereare an increasing number of examples in developed
economies of the second of these applications (e.g., inCanada), I am not
aware of such instances with respect to the first. Thisis not to imply that
there is a lack of recognition in advancedcountries of the significance of
inflation for calculating profits in thetrue economic sense of the term: i.e.,
as net of depreciation at current replacementcost. Indeed, even a cursory
inspection of the various accountingjournals over the past decades yieldsa
multitude of articles on this subject.Furthermore, by supplementing their
standard depreciation allowanceswith special allowances (underone
name or another) for the increased actualcost of replacing their equip-
ment, many firms in these developedeconomies in effect makeuse of
inclexatiori in the determination oftheir respective dividendpolicies.
Correspondingly, the fact that thetax laws of these countries donot
permit an upward adjustment of depreciationto reflect inflationary in-
creases in replacement costs is not dueto error or ignorance, but toan
implicit decision to tax inflationaryprofits as ordinary profitsor, alterna-
tively, ordinary capital gains.And the fact that theseare not "true eco-
nomic profits' is not really relevant.For as my old teacher HenrySimons used to sayin impatientlydismissing as irrelevant fortax policy the long and involvedarguments about whether, from theviewpoint of economic theory, capital gainsare 'rcally" income_agovernment is free to tax whatever it wants totax.2
In the present contextI would add that inflation,as is so frequently
emphasized, is a tax onone kind of assetnamely,money holdings. Why.
then, should other formsof assets necessarily beexempt? But thisis essentially what is involvedin the Brazilianexemption of inflationary































In brief,the question ofwhether or not to index the taxstructure is not a
questiofl ofright or wrong economic analysis. Itis, insteal, a question of
tapolicY.correspondingly, the answer to this question chrcJ he based
primarilY onconsiderations of equity. Now, an inflationary process gener-
ates netlosses for sonicindividuals and net gains for others. Surely, then,
there is nojustification for arguing that as a matter of principle those
individuals who enjoysuch gains should be the very ones to be exempt
from paying taxesupon them. But this is what is involved in the indexatjon
of the Braziliantax system.
To this equityconsideration can he added the efficiency consideration
which Joseph Pechmanhas emphasized in the course of this conference:
namely, that thefailure to index the tax structure (as iii the United States)
reinforces theautomatic stabilizing effect of the government budget.
Let me turn now tothe use of iridexatiori in private contractual arrange-
ments. Insofar asshort-term loans are concerned, indexation is not used
either in Israel or inBrazil, the reason probably being that there is likely to
be less discrepancybetween what we anticipate and what actually hap-
pens the shorterthe period for which we must form our anticipations.
Furthermore, the lossgenerated by such a discrepancy need be borne only
for the relatively shortperiod of such a loan. Correspondingly, in both
economies the short-termrate of interestis simply determined by the
market, and to a large extentreflects the anticipated inflation. Thus, in
Israel (which in 1973 and 1974experienced annual rates of inflation of 20
percent and 40 percent,respectively), the interest rate on bank loansis
25-35 percent, while inBrazil, with its even higher rates of inflation, the
short-term loan rate has beencorrespondingly higher.
In this context I wouldlike to emphasize that the use inBrazil of the
term "pre-lixed indexing"of the short-term interest rate is amisnomer. For
all that is actually involved insuch "indexing" is a raisingof the nominal
interest rate to a fixed, higherlevel which remains unaffectedby ihe actual
rate of inflation that occursduring the period of the loan.it is not indexing
in the true sense of eliminatinguncertainty with respect tothe real rate of
interest thatis actually paid; andIsuspect that the useof the term
"indexing" in this context is simply asemantic device to getaround usury
laws which do not regard payments onaccount of "indexation"as
payments of interest proper.
Before turning to the indexation of long-term
loans (and this isreally the
distinctive application of inclexation), Iwould like to say a fewwords about
the indexation of wage agreements. Inaccordance withwhat I have said
above, let me first of all emphasize that even
if this term is notused in
developed economies (and on occasion itis), the money wageagreements
that are determined there by free collective
bargaining betweenlabor
unions and employers do take accountof anticipatedinflation. From
Indexatiohiconcluding Observations 181observing their behavior,tis (hiltRult to heheve that cit her party to such
agreements sutfers trom money illusionThui, the developed ec(momics
stand in no neerl ot lessons frorii the less-developed,'i iidexe&l'' ones about
the (lesiralJility of adjusting moneywages to irutlationary ck'velupments
Let me go on to say that, in arty event, there is Sonicuui ertai lily al)uut
the nature of the lesson to be learnediiithis respect from the Braziljjii
experience. For my assessment 01'pre-tixed indexa tion'' 01 the Brazilian
short-term interest rate above appliesto its system of wage indexation as
well:itisnot true indexation. Thisisparticularly true of the period
1 965-1 968, during which the so-called indexation formula actuallyfixed a
certain money wage that remained constant during thecilsuing year,
regardless of the rate of inflation which actuaily prevailed. Andthough the
formula was revised in1 968 to correct the money wage of the tolkwing
year for the underestimate ot thei iflatiori rate during tile precedingone,
the formula continuedto specify a future money wage that remairiei-j
constant no matter what the actual rate of inflationwas.
Perhaps the Si niplestway of hiring ing home my poi ut here is to note the
following. There has been much debate duringthis conference about
whether or not real wages in Brazil declined duringsome of the years
following the introduction of thewage indexation formulavet, had this
formula provided indexation inthe true sense of the term, then by
(leflilit ion real wages could not have declined.SoIcannot escape the
inference (confirmed by the contributionsof, for example, Fishlow 11974,
pp. 266-2681 and Baer and Beckernian 11974,pp. 38 and 441 to this
conference) that what has been calledwage indexation"inBrazilis
actually a device by which thegovernment carried out a wage policy that,
for sonic years at least, involveda reduction in the real wage rate.
My observation that the Brazilianwage indexation formula has not been
one of true mndexation can also be broughtout by a Coniparison with the
formula in Israel. There it has beenan explicit or implicit provision ofwage
agreements tlìatifthe rate of inflation exceedsa certainfigure, the
cost-of-living allowance will beincreased accordingly, even during the
course of the existing labor contract. In thisway indexation accomplishes
itstrue purpose of adjustingmoney wages for unanticipatedrates of
inflation, I must, however, admitthat in recent years such adjustnieritshave
not been automatic, but both theirscope and timing have been the subject
of intensive negotiations carriedout with the direct participation of the
government. At the same tinie, the factthat real wages inIsrael have
continuously risen makes thisreservation less significant thanit would
otherwise be.3
We have also had discussionsat this confe,ence about Brazil'sapplica- tion of indexation to theexchange ratethoughwe have learned that this


































tionary judgment onthe part of the authorities. Inan' event, the rapid
adjustment of theexchange rate is a.oii that iiiight W('II be earned by
any çtiitr5'ch (S own) whichimposes a svsteni of exchange
controls on an eCOflOfllYsliticring from intlation. tn particular, the situation
in Israel is onein which, despite the inflation the exchange rate has been
adjusted by officialdevaluations only every few years. Correspondingly in
the interveningperiods distortions base been generated that have been
eliminated only in part by the far more frequent administrative changes in
the effective exchangerate. Thus, many eConomists in Israel feel that we
should take a lesson fromBrazil's experience with its "crawling peg."4
As far as thedeveloped economies are concerned, these have learned an
even betterlesson in recent years: to deal with the problem of (lfterPntial
rates of inflationiby going over to a systeni of flexible exchange rates. So
once again theseeconomies have made use of the free market--as against
the device of indexationt()deal with the adjustment problems created by
inflation.
Let me turn now to theindexation of tong-term loans. Here there has
been true indexation in bothBrazil andIsrael, though it has not been as
extensive as one might think. Inboth countries the government itself has
continued to borrow Irom the private sectorby issuing indexed bonds. But
in both countries there hasbeen a significant retrogression during the Past
years in the degreeof indexation which the government has used for its
own loans to theprivate sector. Thus, in the mnd-)960s theIsraeli
government in effectabandoned itspolicy(>1 indexing loans from its
Development Budget. In particular, itreplaced such indexation with a fixed
higher nominal rate of interestwhich included apremium against infla-
tion." And I have already explainedwhy, the term notwithstanding, such
loans are not really indexed. In viewof the moderate and fairly stable rates
of inflation that marked the 1 960s inIsrael. the abandonment of indexatiori
did not create much of a problem atthat time. But all this has changed in
the last few years, as, despite theextremely high and variable rates of
inflation, the government has refused to return toindexation and has raised
the fixed nominal rate of interest onits loans only with the greatest
reluctance. This failure to reinstate indexationhas been severely criticized
by many economists in Israel, but to noavaiL
It seems to me that somethingsimilar has been going onin Brazil,
particularly since the recent reintensificatioflof the rate of inflation. Thus,
the paper by Baer and Beckerman(1974, pp. 43-44)explains the govern-
ment loans to "basic industries" arenot indexed. The sameis true of loans
to agriculture. Furthermore, evenwhen loans are indexedby a "monetary
correction," the full extent of the correctionis not alwaysdemanded by the
government. Thus, we have heardfrom the Minister ofFinance earlier in
this conference that the "monetarycorrection" on governmentmortgages
IndexaliOI'i: ConcludingObservations 183was limited last year to 20 percent, ck'spite the much higher 'correction''
called for by the actual rate of inflation. Furthermore, thereare sonic
government loans which, to begin with, have specified a "maximum
monetary correction" well below any realistically anticipated rate of
inflation;" correspondingly, just as in the case of "prefixed indexation" of
short-term loans, these are, in effect, unindexed loans at a fixed nominal
rate of interest.
In brief, I feel that we are still in need of a systematic and detailed study
ol the lending policy of the Brazilian government which would determine
the percentage of its loans to which a "monetary correction" has actually
been applied, as well as the extent of such "corrections" when applied.I
suspect that such a study would show that only from a minority of its loans
has the Brazilian government exacted the full "monetary correction" called
for by the actual inflationary developments.
Another significant aspect of both the Israeli and Brazilian experiencesis
that private nonfinancial firms have been willing to borrow indexedfrom
the government, hut generally not from the public] Thismay well express
the simple fact that in view of the subsidy involved, firmscan obtain credit
on better terms from the government than from private lenders. In particu-
lar, it probably reflects the firms' feeling that thegovernment (unlike private
creditors) will not really insist on exacting (lie fully indexedpayment of its
loans should this place tooonerous a burden on them. And from what I
know of the Israeli experience,as well as from the impressions of the
Brazilian experience I have just described,I suspect that the firms' some-
what cynical confidence on thisscore in both countries has been justified
in practice!
It follows that one inferencewe cannot make from the Israeli and
Brazilian experiences is that private firms will bewilling to borrow indexed
in a free capital market. Ina sense, however, we do not need these
experiences for this purpose: the fact is that despite theabsence of legal or
institutional restrictions on indexed borrowingin many of the developed
countries (and in the United States in particular),private firms there have
not undertaken such borrowing.8 This leadsone to suspect that there may
be basic economic reasons for the reluctanceof firms to undertake such
indexed borrowing, and this has been thepuzzle examined in the theoreti-
cal literature referred to above(see footnote 1). On the other hand,we
cannot dismiss the possibility that firms in developedecononiies are still in
the midst of a learningprocess after all, continued t'o-digit inflation in
such economies is a relativelyrecent phenomenon) and that they will
accordingly begin to issue indexed bondsonce they learn to accept such
rates of inflation as part of the factsof economic life.
Of course, we can turn the foregoingquestion about and ask what it is
about the naturef governments (and thegovernments of Israel and Brazil
184 Don Patinkjriare casesin point) thatmakes them, unlike private lirms, willing to issue
indexed bondsOne possible answer may he that governments can under-
take cuchindexed obligations because their income (i.e., their future tax
receipts) isri effectalso indexed (namely, to the nominal GNP). But then
the questionarises as to whetherthis is in practice so much different from
the incomeof large private conglomerates, producing a multitude of
diversified products.
So we mayultimately have to resort to the basic fact that a government
canundertake such obligationsbecause ithas the power of printing
money, andthus by definition cannot gobankwpt. But I feel that even this
is not acomplete answer. For privatefirms also court the danger of
bankruptcy whenthey issue a fixed-interest bond; and intuitively itdoes
not seem to mereasonable to assume that the dangers of bankruptcy must
always he greaterwith an indexed bond.
In any event,let us assume that developedeconomies will continue to
be faced with asituation in which rio supply ofindexed bonds will be
forthcoming from privatefirms. The question then arises as towhether the
governments shouldthemselves supply such bonds. And myfeeling
based primarily onthe experience of Israel, butprobably true also of
Brazilis that itshould. For the existence inIsrael of an easily available
indexed asset hasenabled such weak groups aspensioners and small
savers to protectthemselves from the severeinequities inflation has so
frequently inflicted uponthem. From this viewpointthe issue of iridexed
bonds by the government canhe looked upon as the provisionof a 'public
good" which for various reasonsthe private sector does notsupply.
Another social benefitderived from the existenceof indexed bonds is
that it enables individuals toprotect the real valueof their savings bythe
acquisition of a financial assetinstead of a physical one.For in inflationary
economies in which onlythe latter alternativeexists.real productive
resources tend to bediverted to the excessproduction of physical assets(of
which buildings are a primeexample) in response toindividuals' demand
to acquire such assets as ahedge against inflation.
There is, however, one importantpoint regardingwhich I must sound a
note of caution. Braziland Israel areexamples of economiesthat have
issued a large volume ofindexed governmentbonds and at the sametime
lack developed capitalmarketsand the former mayin part be the cause
of the latter. Thus, in Israel onefrequently hears thecomplaint that private
firms cannot issue bondsthat can competewith thegovernmentind
ones, though in part this0doubtedIy alsoreflects thepreferential tax
treatment given income fromgovernment bonds.Now, a freecapital
market is one of the most crucialand delicate
components of anefficient
market system. Accordingly, I feelt'nat if thegovernments ofthe developed




care to avoid impairing theefficiency of the capital market,Thus, if we accept the view that thegovernmen(5 of developed econutities shouldissue indexed bondsas a public good tomeet certain equity needs, theymight issue such bonds at first in limitedamounts earmarked for such needs(e.g., only for pension funds).This is a question whichrequires much further study.
Itis with this theme ofequity thatI would like to conclude.Ihave already emphasized theobvious fact that thecase for indexation is nota matter of right orwrong economic analysis. Noris indexation apanacea for inflation,or even a means of basicallyaffecting its operations.And I find it particularlynaive to think that the factthat a government knowsthat its debt is indexed willlead it to mend its inflationaryways. Suffice it to point out that therespective rates of inflation in 1)0thIsrael and Brazil have actually increased sharplyin recent years! Thus,to my mind the case for iridexation in anyeconomy..frjlly developedas well as less developed. must rest primarilyon equity consideratiotis.on the grounds that indexa- tion, and tndexationof long-term obligationsin particular, helps avoidthe more extreme inequities thathave so frequently beengenerated by infla- tionaryprocesses.
NOTES
See Fischer (i975, Liviatanand Levhari (1975), andLevhari and liviatan (1976). The reader ss'iIIalso finditinterecting to consult Sirnons'siasons for relecting ihe suggestion thatfor taxpurposes.calculations of depreciation andcapital gains should be adjusted for changesin the value of money (Sinions1938, pp. 155-156). For further details,see Brenner and Patinkin(1976). Since this discussiontook place, Israel did (inJune 1975 adopt somethinglike the "crawling peg," thoughwithout reference toany specific formula See again Brenner andPatinkjn (1976).
I am indebted for thispoint to an unpublished
memorandum by Werner Baer, datedApril 1975. Iii a more recent letterto me commentingon this paper, Baer informsme that in th months since theSão Paulo Conferencetook place, there has beena further erosion in the use of indexationThus all loans from theDevelopment Bank in October1975 had a maximum "monetarycorrection" of 20 percent despitethe much higher rate ofinflation that prevailed
It should however, benoted that beforegovernnicri loans became easilyavai),ihle there were a few Instances of Israelifirms issuing bonds linkedto the price 01 theirown product. The significance 01this choice niay welllie in the fact thata firm's profits are more highly correlated withts osvn price than witha general price index. SeeBrenner and Patinkin (1976).
The fact that the oft-citedexample of Irving Fisher's"stabilized bond'issued in 1925 by Rand.Kardex Co., the forerunnerof Renh:ngtonRn( isthe only exampleso cited simply reinforces this statement Noris ii without significance thatIrving Fisher wasone of the founders and majorstockholders of Rand-Kardex,and a most persistentand insistent man who never tired ofbelaboring a point!I might also note thatFisher's bond provided for indexation only in theevent that the price increase
exceeded iOçf. (Fisher,1934, pp. 112, 387-389; Reeve,1943, p. 164),